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Auditors’ Liability to Investors for Clients’ Inadequate Disclosure 
or
The Auditor as Police Dog
GUEST WRITER: This column was written by 
Margaret R. Liles, a staff auditor with the 
Seattle office of Price Waterhouse & Co. Ms. 
Liles recently received her M.B.A. from the 
University of Washington.
The article is in two parts and will be concluded 
in the July 1976 issue.
Introduction
In 1896 Lord Justice Lopes characterized 
the responsibilities of an auditor for the 
detection of fraud by restating criteria 
which for years have been accepted as the 
proper test of auditors' liability:
"[An auditor] is a watch dog, but not 
a bloodhound. He is justified in 
believing tried servants of the com­
pany in whom confidence is placed 
by the company. He is entitled to 
assume that they are honest, and to 
rely upon their representations, 
provided he takes reasonable care. If 
there is anything calculated to excite 
suspicion he should probe it to the 
bottom; but in the absence of any­
thing of that kind he is only bound 
to be reasonably cautious and care­
ful.
. . . ."Auditors must not be made 
liable for not tracking out ingenious 
and carefully laid schemes of fraud 
when there is nothing to arouse 
their suspicion, and when those 
frauds are perpetrated by tried ser­
vants of the company and are unde­
tected for years by the directors. So 
to hold would make the position of 
an auditor intolerable."1
In view of the explosive growth of 
securities law fraud litigation in recent 
years and recent court cases imposing 
professional liability under the securities 
laws, it is respectfully submitted that Lord 
Justice Lopes' view is obsolete and that the 
role of the auditor, at least in the eyes of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), is not even that of bloodhound — 
much less watchdog — in fact, it now 
seems to have become that of police dog.
The auditor's duties as police dog and 
the emerging grounds for liability as im­
posed by recent cases are in this article 
analyzed in terms of three functions: 1) the 
duty to investigate (the "Sniff" Function), 
2) the duty to disclose (the "Bark" Func­
tion), and 3) the duty to alert authorities 
(the "Bite" Function). Some consequences 
for accountants of the new standards of 
liability and the auditor's new role as 
police dog are also explored.
Background
Legal Basis for Liability
Any liability of an account for improper 
disclosure by a client must be in the nature 
of a derived liability — that is, the client 
must first do something illegal and the 
accountant must be deemed liable as a 
participant or aider and abettor in some 
fashion. In order to understand accoun­
tants' liability, it is thus essential first to 
explore the basis on which the client 
becomes liable.
The statutory and regulatory provisions 
most frequently relied upon in private 
litigation by investors charging securities 
fraud in financings are Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Ex­
change Act) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. 
Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for any 
person (using the jurisdictional in­
strumentalities of the mails or interstate 
commerce) in connection with the pur­
chase or sale of a security: "1) to employ 
any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, 
2) to make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the state­
ments made, in the light of the circum­
stances under which they were made, not 
misleading or, 3) to engage in any act, 
practice or course of business which oper­
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit 
upon any person . .
In connection with a fully-registered 
offering of securities, civil liability for 
damages to any purchaser of the securities 
for material misstatements or omissions 
contained in the financial statements in a 
registration statement is expressly im­
posed upon auditors, as well as upon the 
issuing corporation, its officers, directors, 
certain experts and underwriters, by Sec­
tion 11 of the Securities Act of 1933.
Language substantially similar to that 
contained in Rule 10b-5 is used in other 
sections of the federal securities laws to 
give investors a cause of action against 
sellers of securities for material misstate­
ments or omissions in prospectuses and 
other communications,2 proxy solicita­
tions by registered companies,3 tender 
offers,4 and documents filed with the SEC 
under the Exchange Act.5 Moreover, in 
most state securities laws ("Blue Sky" 
Laws) there is an express civil liability 
section akin to Section 12 of the Securities 
Act and a general antifraud provision very 
similar to Rule 10b-5.
Rule 10b-5 contains broad provisions 
which are not limited to a financing in 
which a corporation receives proceeds 
from the sale of securities. General finan­
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cial information which could foreseeably 
cause investors to purchase or sell a com­
pany's securities, such as that issued in 
press releases and periodic reports to 
shareholders, may lead to liability of a 
company under Rule 10b-5 if such infor­
mation contains material misstatements or 
omissions.6 Notably absent in the lan­
guage of Rule 10b-5 is any delineation of 
duties owed, or by whom and to whom 
such duties may be owed. It has been left 
to the courts to interpret the Rule and 
fashion a standard of conduct for liability 
and successful defense thereof in 10b-5 
cases.
The party initially and principally re­
sponsible for fraudulent conduct in securi­
ties fraud cases in which an independent 
accountant is involved is usually the ac­
countant's client company and its man­
agement. Securities fraud has come to 
mean imperfect disclosure as to all mate­
rial facts in official company statements — 
a very different concept from the willful or 
criminal fraud of the common law variety 
traditionally referred to in the literature of 
the accounting profession. Financial in­
formation is initially the undertaking of 
the client. The independent accountant's 
undertaking in these matters is tra­
ditionally limited to the expression of an 
opinion on the fairness of the financial 
statements furnished by the client for re­
view.
If accountants are liable, they usually 
would be so on a derived or secondary 
basis for having participated in or aided 
and abetted the illegal conduct of a client. 
By means of their opinion issued on the 
misleading financial statements or their 
association with unaudited statements or 
other data, the auditors may be charged 
with participating in or aiding and abet­
ting the misstatement or omission of ma­
terial information. Recent securities fraud 
litigation typically includes charges that 
accountants, as a result of their work pur­
suant to the audit engagement, either 
knew or should have known of their 
client's disclosure deficiencies and thus 
may be liable to investors on an aider and 
abettor theory.
Current SEC Crusade for Higher 
Professional Standards (i.e. Greater 
Liability)
In recent years the SEC has undertaken a 
drive to hold accountants to higher pro­
fessional standards. This drive has been 
conducted through SEC lawsuits against 
members of the accounting profession, 
public expression of views by SEC Com­
missioners and its Chief Accountant, and 
SEC amicus curiae briefs in civil lawsuits.
Commissioner Sommer quite correctly 
points out that accountants are in a unique 
strategic position, by virtue of their power 
and traditional independence, to influ­
ence corporate behavior, to detect securi­
ties frauds in the incipiency, and to nip a 
fraud before it blossoms.7 Moreover, the 
popular (albeit perhaps misguided) view 
is that the presence of a reputable accoun­
tant in a business transaction constitutes 
an assurance, if not legitimacy, of at least 
accurate presentation. In Commissioner 
Sommer's view, the public's expectations 
in this regard should be met to the extent 
practicable.8
SEC Chief Accountant Burton echoes 
Commissioner Sommer on the policies 
behind recent enforcement activities by 
the Commission involving professionals:
"... The SEC enforcement program 
is designed to maintain the integrity 
of the market place and deter fraud 
. . .: these professionals are an 
essential element in providing ac­
cess to the market place, since the 
sale of securities cannot take place 
without their involvement. Profes­
sional responsibility at these points 
of access can prevent many ques­
tionable activities before they occur 
"9
The key issue in the crusade for in­
creased accountants' responsibility for 
proper disclosure by their clients in busi­
ness transactions has been aptly stated by 
former Chairman Garrett:
"The problem... is the involvement 
of accountants and lawyers in the 
failure of issuers to comply with the 
requirements of our laws for full and 
fair disclosure of material informa­
tion."10
In Garrett's view, a really successful fraud 
cannot be accomplished in our complex 
financial world without the help of ac­
countants and lawyers. He views the ac­
countants' proper role as that of police 
officers — to insist in their corporate and 
financial practice upon compliance with 
the law in accordance with professional 
standards. Garrett praises the efforts of 
the accounting profession to enunciate 
professional standards and guidelines, 
but he adds the following caveat:
". . .The final goal of full and fair 
disclosure must in the end govern 
over the mechanical adherence to 
any conceivable checklist. . . . Ac­
countants and lawyers are in the 
front line of law enforcement, help­
ing to achieve the goals of . . . full 
and fair disclosure to investors 
"11
This then is the sum and substance of 
the SEC's crusade: the SEC has deputized 
each and every accountant and attorney to 
be an enforcement agent of the Commis­
sion in the detection and prevention of 
securities fraud. Moreover, the SEC 
would involve public accountants in areas 
in which accountants have traditionally 
refused to accept responsibility, such as 
interim reports and press releases. 
Nonetheless, speeches by SEC Commis­
sioners also state that it is not expected 
that "auditors . .. become insurers against 
all forms of management fraud, however 
carefully concealed,"11 but only in "ap­
propriate cases."12 If auditors have been 
sufficiently careful and are merely victims 
of the client's duplicity, they should not be 
liable. The unanswered question, of 
course, is: how careful is sufficiently care­
ful?
Flexible Duty Standard
The SEC's theory is that the extent of an 
accountant's duty to investigate and dis­
close material facts will be determined in 
the light of the surrounding circumstances 
of the particular case, with emphasis upon 
a CPA's duty to the investing public. 
Commissioner Sommer indicates that 
with respect to Rule 10b-5 violations the 
old mechanistic application of traditional 
common law concepts (such as scienter, 
reliance, etc.) is eroding, and that trying to 
measure conduct by such ambiguous con­
cepts is "a bit of a waste of time." Instead, 
Commissioner Sommer, quoting exten­
sively from the recent Ninth Circuit opin­
ion in White v. Abrams,13 advocates a 
flexible duty standard, whereby
"... one must look to the nature of 
the duty properly imposed upon the 
auditor, the extent to which his [sic] 
work is expectably relied upon, the 
indications of departure from ac­
cepted norms of the profession, the 
suggestions of submission to pres­
sures from clients, the extent of his 
[sic] awareness of the picture the 
financial statements present to one 
relying upon them, and the serious­
ness of the consequences if care is 
not exercised."14
Hence, most suits against accountants 
under Rule 10b-5 would not be dismissed 
for lack of scienter (knowledge and intent 
to deceive) and would proceed to trial. An 
accountant's duties would thus presum­
ably be subjectively determined by each 
jury on a case-by-case basis. The courts, in 
applying the flexible duty standard advo­
cated by Commissioner Sommer, would 
assess the duties and degree of care 
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applied by accountants in each specific 
factual context. An accountant could be 
held liable to investors for a client's in­
adequate disclosure even though she or he 
was unaware of the error. As Commis­
sioner Sommer notes, application of the 
flexible duty standard by the courts would 
undoubtedly result in an upgrading of 
performance by CPAs,15 and the fear of 
liability is an effective, albeit costly, 
stimulus to increased diligence and better 
disclosure.
Many legal commentators expect the 
flexible duty standard for professional 
liability espoused by the court in White v. 
Abrams will be adopted by other circuit 
courts in cases brought under Rule 10b-5 
in the future. For public accountants the 
prospect of such increased exposure to 
liability for breach of duty, coupled with 
the magnitude of damages generally in­
volved in securities law cases, is unset­
tling, to say the least, particularly if such 
duties are to be defined in an unpredicta­
ble fashion.
The Sniff Function — Auditors' 
Liability for Inadequate 
Investigation
One application of the flexible duty 
standard for accountant defendants is il­
lustrated by Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,16 a 
case on appeal from the Seventh Circuit to 
the Supreme Court.
The underlying fraud in this case was 
committed by Leston B. Nay, president 
and 92% owner of First Securities Com­
pany of Chicago, a small brokerage firm. 
Nay had created certain spurious escrow 
accounts in which some of his brokerage 
customers (plaintiffs) had invested, and 
he had secretly used the funds for his own 
purposes. The injured investors claimed 
that Ernst & Ernst, auditors of First Securi­
ties Company, were negligent in perform­
ing their audit, that is, in failing to dis­
cover (i.e. sniff out) and follow up by 
additional testing the existence of Nay's 
"mail rule," whereby only Nay was to 
open mail addressed to him, even when 
he was absent from the office, and Ernst & 
Ernst was thereby guilty of facilitating or 
aiding and abetting Nay's concealed 
fraud.
The Hochfelder court focused on the 
auditor's duties to investors in analyzing 
the necessary elements for aiding and 
abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5. After 
rejecting the contention that proof of the 
auditors' knowledge of their client's 
fraudulent scheme is necessary to main­
tain a claim against them, the court found 
it necessary to show only that, if the 
defendant had a duty of inquiry,
"The party charged with aiding and 
abetting had knowledge of or, but for 
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a breach of the duty of inquiry, should 
have had knowledge of the fraud, and 
that possessing such knowledge the 
party failed to act due to an improp­
er motive or breach of a duty of 
disclosure."17 [Emphasis supplied.]
This case is somewhat unusual in that 
the auditors' client who committed the 
fraud was a brokerage firm, required by 
statute18 to file audited annual financial 
statements with the SEC. Hence, because 
of their audit engagement, the auditors, 
Ernst & Ernst, had a statutory duty of 
inquiry which inured to investors. Be­
cause there was no proof of reliance on the 
auditors' report by the injured investors, 
the court found no common law duty of 
inquiry. The expansion of auditors' re­
sponsibilities to investors under the secu­
rities laws beyond the duties imposed by 
common law standards is thus well illus­
trated by this case.
The Hochfelder case stands for the prop­
osition that whenever an audit is done 
pursuant to some statutory requirement 
for filing financial statements with the 
SEC, (such as a prospectus, a 10-K report, 
and perhaps an annual report to share­
holders) the auditor who breaches a duty 
of inquiry due to failure to sniff out fraud 
may be liable to investors under Rule 
10b-5. This would result although inves­
tors have not seen the auditor's report, 
although the auditor is unaware of the 
client's fraud, and although there is no 
privity of contract between auditor and 
investor. In circumstances not involving 
SEC filings, if investors actually rely on 
the auditor's report, presumably the req­
uisite duty of inquiry would also be 
found to flow to investors.
It thus is not difficult for a court to find 
that auditors have a duty to sniff long and 
hard at the financial condition of their 
client. Whether or not liability will be 
imposed will then be determined by a 
finding of negligence in the audit resulting 
in breach of that duty, which also is an 
issue of fact to be determined at trial. The 
Hochfelder court appears to lend some 
comfort to accountants in that the court 
says that if auditors follow generally ac­
cepted auditing standards (GAAS) in 
conducting their audit review, they will be 
protected from liability to investors for 
failing to detect fraud.
Unfortunately, GAAS do not often spell 
out precise procedures an auditor should 
follow, and auditing procedures are often 
a matter of judgment. From the benefit of 
hindsight it is almost always possible to 
perceive additional steps an auditor could, 
and thus presumably should, have taken 
to lead to the uncovering of a client's 
fraudulent conduct. Since the adequacy of 
an auditor's auditing procedures is to be 
an issue of fact to be determined at trial, 
and since even accountants will have dif­
fering opinions as to what should have 
been done in close cases, it should not be 
difficult for plaintiffs in many such cases to 
provide expert witnesses who will assert 
that the defendant auditors should have 
taken additional steps. It follows that the 
wide latitude in determining whether or 
not there has been compliance with GAAS 
means that attempted reliance upon 
GAAS offers little assurance of protection 
from liability to investors in the cases 
which by virtue of hindsight are "close 
cases."
In the second and concluding part of 
this article, we will explore the "Bark" and 
"Bite" functions and whether or not old 
dogs can be taught new tricks.
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